Energy and Transportation Policy by Sagner, James S.
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
UMR-MEC Conference on Energy 
09 Oct 1975 
Energy and Transportation Policy 
James S. Sagner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/umr-mec 
 Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Mechanical Engineering Commons, 
Mining Engineering Commons, Nuclear Engineering Commons, and the Petroleum Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sagner, James S., "Energy and Transportation Policy" (1975). UMR-MEC Conference on Energy. 72. 
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/umr-mec/72 
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in UMR-MEC Conference on Energy by an authorized administrator of Scholars' Mine. This 
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the 
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
ENERGY AND TRANSPORTATION POLICY
James S . Sagner 
Southern Illinois University 
Edwardsville, Illinois
Abstract
Energy shortages of recent years suggest a re-examina- 
tion of national transportation policy. The lack of a 
coordinated approach to the solution of urban cogestion 
inhibits potential short-run responses to gasoline 
shortfalls. Longer-range policy, particularly in the 
context of severe financial constraints, must be care­
fully integrated with demonstrated patterns of urban 
travel and population and employment dec si t i.c s . Given 
these considerations, metropolitan areas now planning 
or constructing rapid rail facilities may be selecting 
inappropriate responses to the problem of urban access.
1ft?
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an analytical discussion of energy 
considerations in the planning of urban transportation 
systems. Recent developments in energy availabilities, 
federal funding programs, and actual system operations 
suggest that criteria have become particularly essen­
tial in the selection of viable candidate cities for 
future federal and local investment in high cost, 
fixed route technology.
Short-run energy impacts on transportation in major 
American cities were examined by the author in a 
recent paper^ under these hypotheses:
(1 ) that the worker's place of employment
and residence are fixed (Ln the short-run),
(2) that the availability of more energy 
efficient vehicles is extremely limited 
(in the short-run),
(3) that car pooling and the use of alternative 
transportation modes (i.e., buses, rapid 
rail transit, taxicabs, etc.) are only 
feasible to the experience at the top end 
of the interquartile range (i.e., seventy- 
fifth percentile) in an array of such cities.
The results attained indicate that, on average an 
eight to ten percent shortfall of energy would be 
resolved through increased public and private mass 
transit patronage, car pooling, and more efficient 
driving and engine operation.2 Although any nation­
wide shortfall substantially in excess of ten percent 
would appear to result in a reduction of non-work trips 
such as shopping and vacation travel, the analysis for 
any particular city would have to proceed on the basis 
of the attributes of that city.3
It is the purpose of this study to discuss the impli­
cations of energy and federal policy constraints on 
longer-range transportation planning practice. Vari­
ous researchers have concluded that mass transit is 
more efficient than the automobile by multiples ranging 
from about two to about ten, depending on the assump­
tions incorporated in the specific analysis (see 
Table 1). Given the overwhelming predominance of the 
automobile in urban travel,^ predictions of tremendous 
energy savings have been made if this pattern could 
only be altered nationwide.^ A more rational and 
successful approach to the analysis may be to deter­
mine factors of consumer demand for transportation 
energy and to develop economical responses in a finite 
number of locales. The methodology employed in this 
study is to examine journey-to-work pat-terns in three 
representative American cities, and to determine the 
appropriateness of highway, rail and bus solutions 
given the specific attributes of each.
use is primarily for commutation, and non-work pur­
poses constitute only a small protion of such acti­
vity. ^  Thus, journey-to-work analysis is highly 
relevant to the question of transportation planning.
II. RECENT FEDERAL POLICY ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to 
review the lengthy history of federal participation 
in the development of urban transportation.10 Briefly, 
city growth has been influenced by three major trends 
in transportation: the unimodal concept of funding, 
with the primary emphasis on highways; the deteriora­
tion of the railroads and public transit facilities; 
and, despite some local planning impetus initiated 
by the federal government,H a general inaction by 
local governments in innovative planning. Although 
one may hold that the national government should, 
logically, adopt the viewpoint of the interest of 
society as a whole,1 2 it has become apparent that the 
complexity of the American economy will not permit 
this "public interest" to be generally understood and 
incorporated in the national transportation planning 
process.
Thus, some federal policy initiatives have recently 
been considered for return to state and local control. 
For example, the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1973 and 
the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 
1974 delivered major impetuses for a multimodal ap­
proach to planning, as cities are now permitted to 
divert a portion of their highway trust fund money 
to mass transit capital and operating expenditures.
Of particular significance to this discussion has 
been the growing participation by local governments 
in the federal aid process fostered by the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration (UMTA). Numerous cities 
have come to Washington with proposals for a portion 
of the limited bus and rapid transit funds, and 
criteria for approval or rejection appear to be 
either nonexistent or changing depending on the poli­
tical vicissitudes of the moment.
The lure of eighty percent federal funding of the 
planning and capital costs of rapid transit induced 
the development of grandiose construction programs by 
several urban areas, including Baltimore, Los Angeles, 
Miami, Denver, Atlanta, and others. These actions 
were encouraged by frequent assurances from the past 
U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary, John A. 
Volpe, of governmental support, provided the local 
matching share of the money could be guaranteed.
For example, Volpe told Denver officials on October 12, 
1972, that the initial experimental work would be 
federally* financed. Furthermore, if the local share 
were raised, "We stand ready at the Federal level to 
provide two-thirds of the cost. . ." for the initial 
phase of the system. Denver residents subsequently 
approved a transportation bond issue on the basis of 
this implied promise.14
Although the work trip constitutes the largest portion 
of urban passenger travel , 6 prior to the 1970 Census 
of Population little data had been systematically 
collected by any federal agency on work communtation 
habits or on other travel activities.2 The recent 
publication of journey-to-work data® provides some 
basis for our analysis of urban travel demands, al­
though it is acknowledged that non-work trips are 
excluded from the discussion. However, public transit
The current U.S. Department of Transportation position 
is that limited UMTA funds require selective approval 
of recipient cities based on "cost effective" analysis 
of alternative transportation systems, and that past 
"promises" are not necessarily to be construed as 
definite commitments.35 Federal officials cite as 
jujtification such disappointments as the recurring 
technological failures and cost overruns of San Fran­
cisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) and the Morgan­
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town (West Virginia) experimental personal rapid tran­
sit (PRD system, as well as the continued nationwide 
reduction in transit patronage despite the expenditure 
of some three billion dollars on programs of urban 
transportation assistance.
Local reaction to this changing federal posture has 
been, as expected, heated. Atlanta Mayor, Maynard 
Jackson, stated: "We stuck our necks out. . ." be­
cause the city received ". . . not only the go-ahead 
but actually the aggressive encouragement of the 
Federal Government. . ."to build a transit system.
Now Atlanta is being told that aid may not be forth­
coming, a situation tantamount to ". . . our being on 
a limb, and the Federal Government behind us sawing 
if off . " 1 5
Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland, on learning of 
this apparent change in policy,17 stated that ". . .
all the indications . . . "  point to a federal with­
drawal from Baltimore rapid transit. ". . .[T]hey have 
led Baltimore city right down the dark alley again and 
. . .  I think this is the most disgusting performance 
of bureaucracy I've ever seen . . . There is no way 
the City of Baltimore or the State of Maryland could 
make up these funds in order to keep the project 
going."18
(5) subject to rather rigid federal funding 
limitations.
Most important, fixed rail rapid transit assumes a 
relatively stable combination of jobs and population, 
which is not the typical situation in Twentieth 
Century America. Recent U.S. Bureau of the Census 
analysis confirms that population movement from the 
city and suburbs is continuing to sections further out 
in exurbia. Employment in metropolitan areas outside 
the central city is increasing faster than the popu­
lation, and workers can therefore commute more easily 
from housing now developed beyond metropolitan-area 
boundaries. 2 2
This continuing dispersion of population and jobs be­
yond the central city follows the trend begun follow­
ing the Second World War with the availability of the 
automobile and improved highways. When planners 
decry the "irrationality" of urban commuters in 
choosing other than the most cost efficient transporta­
tion mode for their journey-to-work,23 it must be 
remembered that the trip duration to work is con­
siderably longer by transit than by auto.24 Thus, 
with this great dispersion into exurbia, it becomes 
difficult to justify transit on the basis of pro­
jected patronage estimates.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF POPULATION MOBILITY
The goal of any transportation system should be to 
provide a satisfactory level of movement for people 
(and goods) so that delays, congestion, pollution, 
and energy consumption are minimized. Too frequently, 
it appears that policy makers and government officials 
have sub-optimized the decision-making process; that 
is, they have failed to consider all factors in the 
selection of transportation systems and in the promise 
of funds for the construction of such systems. This 
is particularly apparent with regard to rapid rail 
transit, for as each new urban or energy crisis 
occurs, this magical solution is suggested.
The hard facts, however, are that rapid rail transit 
is:
(1) expensive (Baltimore's first two legs 
of a proposed six legged radial system, 
now costing over one and one-quarter 
billion dollars, inflated nearly one 
hundred percent in thirty months);
(2) technologically imperfect (BART's trans- 
Bay run was long-delayed in receiving 
approval of the California Public Utilities 
Commission, due to various operating 
malfunctions);
(3) not self supporting (BART will never 
reach a self-supporting level of 
operations, even with 2 2 0 , 0 0 0 passangers 
per day) ; 2 0
(4) not a limitation on congestion (the 
Montreal, Milan, and Stockholm systems 
have not removed traffic congestion, while 
ninety percent of Toronto's patrons are 
converts from the old bus system) ; 2 1  and,
Furthermore, this changing and mobile pattern does 
not suggest the implementation of high cost, long- 
run solutions, particularly given the social and 
aesthetic disruptions inherent in extensive right- 
of-way acquisition and construction of trackage and 
s t a t i o n s . T h i s  is especially true considering the 
extremely long planning period prior to implementa­
tion; i.e., a ten to fifteen year period is typical 
in the state of California, whereas the city of 
Baltimore has been planning its system for more than 
a decade.
Finally, the potential for a reversal in this pattern 
of migration is rather unlikely, " . . .  except by a 
degree of compulsion incompatible with a free 
society."26 While the hopes of rapid transit pro­
ponents may be to halt the decay of the central city 
by Increased suburban commutation, 7 the facts are that 
people, jobs, and shopping are increasingly oriented 
to locations outside of the central city. "The con­
ventional concept of the urban community. . . has to 
be reconsidered. . . Increasingly the movement of 
people within urban complexes will be multidirectional 
on relatively low-density traffic corridors."28
IV. TOWARD FIXED RAIL CRITERIA
Despite these rather definite reasons against the in­
discriminate use of fixed rapid rail, the lure of the 
federal money has proven irresistible to many cities. 
Given the limitation of funding, on what criteria 
should approval be based? Many schemes have been 
suggested for the integration of land use and trans­
portation models for the selection of the optimal 
policies from a broad range of plans with varying 
economic and social effects.29 However, existing 
practice still cannot incorporate axiomatic inter­
relationships between these sectors,80 while newer 
modelling and computer technologies may only serve 
to permit predictions of distant years with a larger 
order of errors. 81
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Little else exists in the literature to provide guid­
ance on the planning of transit systems. Comments 
do appear regarding suggested minimum densities, such 
as a central city of at least 1 0 , 0 0 0  persons per 
square m i le ,32 Qr at least 40,000 patrons per day and 
metropolitan areas with a population of at least one 
m i l l i o n . T h u s ,  into this seeming vacuum comes the 
high cost, technologically complex solution: build 
everywhere, or at least until the money runs out.
The important consideration in this context should be 
the retention of mobility in the journey to the cen­
tral city in those areas where future central city 
activity justifies fixed rapid rail transit. Of 
special significance in this determination, given our 
inability to forecast the future (despite simulation 
model builders' claims to the contrary), is the exist­
ing pattern of employment concentrations within the 
central city. The basic assumption, then, is that 
cities of highly dispersed employment are less able to 
justify commuter fixed rail tranist systems than are 
central cities of concentrated employment.
Table 2 presents data on the concentration of employ­
ment in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSA's) and central city's of thirty major metro­
politan areas, including the ratio of central city 
employment to SMSA employment and a ranking within the 
array. Table 3 presents data on the use of transit 
modes for the journey-to-work in each SMSA, including 
bus and streetcar patronage; the percentage of in the 
SMSA using these transit modes for the journey-to- 
work; and a ranking within the array.
For purposes of further analysis, it is necessary to 
select a limited number of these cities of varying 
attributes of worker concentration and transit use. 
From these tables three cities are selected to illus­
trate varying stages in economic-transportation 
development:
(1) Sharply reduced central city worker 
concentration with average transit 
ridership (characteristic of older 
urban areas with a declining central 
city base of dense work attractions): 
Baltimore, Maryland.
(2) Somewhat reduced central city work con­
centration with low transit ridership 
(characteristic of maturing urban areas 
with some loss of central city economic 
activities): Kansas City, Missouri.
(3) Continuing high central city worker con­
centration but low transit ridership 
(characteristic of newly developing urban 
areas with intact central cities):
Phoenix, Arizona. Thus, in descending 
order is arrayed the oldest to the newest 
city forms, which is also consistent with 
the present magnitude of demand for fixed 
rapid rail transit from each city type 
(see Table 4).
V. BALTIMORE: TOO LATE FOR RAPID RAIL
The city of Baltimore, Maryland, responded to the 
urban decline of the Post-War period with the con­
struction of downtown office buildings and shipping 
facilities, and the redevelopment of the Baltimore 
harbor area. However, the pattern of central city 
worker dispersion was not arrested, and was likely 
exacerbated by the substitution of "white-collar" 
employment for the more concentrated "blue-collar" 
factory work which was largely eliminated during the 
renewal process. Thus, the concentration of workers 
in 1960 in the central city of 64.8% (Table 5) had 
declined to 42.1% (Table 2) by 1970, as denser work 
"attractions" were systematically moved to outlying 
locations.
Planning began during this time for rapid transit to 
serve the central city commuter. The final suggested 
configuration was a six-legged steel wheel on steel 
rail system, with each leg extending from the center 
of Baltimore City (Charles Center), to population 
centers in the surrounding suburban areas. Final 
engineering grants for the Northwest and Southern 
lines were made in 1972, based on an estimated cost 
of $656 million (now estimated at $1.2 billion) with 
the local share of this expenditure guaranteed by the 
Maryland General Assembly. Total costs for the com­
pleted system are unknown, but may run to several 
billion dollars.
The bus system in the metropolitan area was absorbed 
by the Maryland Department of Transportation, and 
received renewed support through the multi-model 
funding authority of that agency. During the fiscal 
year of 1972, 370 new buses were delivered, reducing 
the average age of the bus fleet from fifteen to six 
years, while a two year rehabiliation program to re­
paint and repair 250 later model vehicles continued. 
This governmental interest, together with an apparent 
tradition of public transit patronage, resulted in 
100 million riders for fiscal 1972, an increase of
1 . 1  percent over the preceding year.34
While the primary and secondary highway construction 
programs also continued during this period, a con­
troversy developed surrounding the city's planned 
expressway system. At the present time, this "3A" 
system of interstate and commuting roadways is esti­
mated to cost $1.25 billion (with a local contribu­
tion of twenty percent), while construction costs 
rise at a significant rate.35 The existing express­
way inventory in the entire SMSA is 144 miles, in­
cluding the Baltimore Beltway (1-695), the Jones Falls 
Expressway (1-83), the Kennedy Memorial Highway (1-95 
North), 1-95 South (to Washington), and 1-70 North 
(to Frederick), in addition to some expressway- 
standard construction on the primary system. Thus, a 
rather extensive highway system is planned, under 
construction, or in operation, accommodating in 
several places as many as 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 + vehicles of daily 
traffic.
The short-run impact of the energy crisis on journey- 
to-work trips in the Baltimore metropolitan area has 
previously been determined as a relatively low, five 
percent diversion to carpools and alternative trans­
portation modes.36 Any fuel shortfall greater than 
about five percent of demand will lead to a signifi­
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cant reduction in non-work trips. However, this 
predicament does not support the planned rapid transit 
expenditures, but does seem to imply the wisdom of 
continued bus schedule expansion (and highway recon­
struction) . The reason for this paradox is that the 
finite amount of available federal transportation 
dollars delimits possible capital improvements to 
those projects more "cost effective"-*' in times of 
fuel shortages, and that a rapid transit system is not 
an appropriate investment given the residence-employ­
ment mix in the Baltimore area. Instead, the availa­
bility and flexibility of the bus and highway modes 
appear to make these the superior choices.
VI. KANSAS CITY: THE TIME FOR RAPID RAIL
The Kansas City, Missouri - Kansas area responded to 
the problems of urban decay later than did the city of 
Baltimore, with the "coerced" creation in 1966 of the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission - Kansas City Region 
(Metroplan) following the federal denial of Section 
701 planning grant money. This delay may ultimately 
work to the advantage of Kansas City, as it has allow­
ed sufficient time for the mistakes and wrong turns of 
other cities to have been examined and rejected. How­
ever, one expert has stated: "The city has not learn­
ed the lessons about growth that Eastern cities have. 
Industry is leaving the central city rapidly and the 
blacks are frozen out. There is no low-to-moderate 
income housing out there along 1-435, the ring highway, 
and no rapid transit to take them out. . ."38
As in Baltimore, the concentration of workers in the 
central city had declined from 1960 to 1970, from 
58.6% (Table 6) to 53.3% (Table 2), although the rate 
of decline was substantially slower. Thus, suffi­
cient time may yet exist for a correction of this 
trend, provided appropriate action is taken by the 
planning officials of the region. Mechanisms do 
exist for such policy implementation, for Metroplan 
works concurrently with the Mid-American Council of 
Governments (MACOG), established in 1967, which has 
the more general perspective and political ability to 
implement such plans, and with the Kansas City Trans­
portation Authority, established in 1965, which has 
jurisdiction over passenger transit.
To this time transportation planning has been sub­
ordinate to land use planning, although the Kansas 
City Transportation Authority in 1969 did purchase and 
now operates the private Kansas City Transit Company, 
after threats of termination of service. However, 
the major thrusts of the past decade have been a 
constant flow of planning ideas from MetroDlan ori­
ented toward the control of urban sprawl, and the 
development of such attractions as the Kansas Inter­
national Airport, a new stadium, a sport arena, a 
downtown convention center, new shopping areas, and 
other civic attractions.
With only thirty-one percent of total metropolitan 
area mileage now traveled by Kansas City, Missouri- 
Kansas residents to Kansas City employment and a con­
tinuing pattern of horizontal growth spreading out­
ward from the central core, specific plans are under 
consideration to direct investment toward more accept- 
ible developmental patterns.41 For example, the 
Metro/Center concept envisions a series of new towns 
of ". . . high activity core area(s)that would offer
employment opportunities, retail outlets, services and 
recreational facilities necessary to serve about
200.000 people, all within 15 or 20 minutes of the 
Metro/Center core.
Loci of these centers include the central business 
districts of Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas, the 
Plaza (a shopping-commercial center), and eight other 
sites chosen on the basis of origin and destination 
zonal projections.43 Careful selection and land use 
controls could foster the building of corridors of 
sufficient travel demand to enable rapid rail transit, 
such as the Kansas City International Airport complex- 
to-downtown corridor which is expected to generate
125.000 + trips daily by 1990. Present access plans 
are for 70,000 to 90,000 average daily traffic on 
highways 1-29 and U.S. 169, with the suggested pur­
chase of rights-of-way for exclusive busways and, 
ultimately, rail rapid transit.44
The short-run impact of the energy crisis on journey- 
to-work trips in the Kansas City metropolitan area has 
previously been determined as about a fifteen percent 
diversion to carpools and alternative transportation 
modes.45 This situation (an approximately average 
result) does not per se eliminate or support rail 
transit. The important consideration is that Kansas 
City has not suffered a permanent loss of central city 
employment and has begun efforts to define land use 
along specified corridors of potentially dense acti­
vity. This may be the very situation which justifies 
some rapid rail, in that the central city can be pre­
served while permitting the growth of selected radial 
corridors. Unfortunately, little support is thought 
to exist for such an undertaking from civic and busi­
ness groups, although Mayor Charles B. Wheeler, Jr., 
is a strong advocate.4° Perhaps Kansas City is 
doomed to repeat the mistakes of the older Eastern 
cities.
VII. PHOENIX: TOO EARLY FOR RAPID RAIL
Urban problems are rather new phenomena to the city 
of Phoenix, Arizona, and, consequently, recognition 
of the situation has come only recently. The central 
city was a small and charming desert "oasis" some 
thirty years ago, whereas today it services a metro­
politan area containing several municipalities, more 
than one hundred shopping centers, and a population 
of nearly one million.47
This type of explosive development does not permit 
orderly land use control, and as a result, Phoenix 
". . . i s  suffering the worst case of urban sprawl 
in the U.S. . . "48 with no sign of-correction in the 
near future. While environmentalists may decry the 
loss of a lifestyle based upon fresh, dry air and open 
land, y the virtually unrestricted economic potential 
does not suggest limitations on sprawl devleopment and 
urban decay. Employment concentration in the central 
city actually increased during the decade of the 
Sixties, from 60.4 percent (Table 7) to 62.5 percent 
(Table 2) , an increase partially attributable to the 
sheer size of the city, 187.6 square miles, as com­
pared to the cities under study: 130.3 square miles 
in Kansas City and 78.3 square miles in Baltimore. 
However, "leapfrog sprawl" now characterizes the 
metropolitan area and new communities appear on 
previously open land beyond the locational control of 
Maricopa County.30
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An early return to central city development does not 
seem likely according to various Arizona observers• 51- 
Residents have resisted high density development as 
well as freeway construction, and appear to desire 
small town life in the big city. Some calls for con­
trols on future growth are being made, but these may 
not occur for some time. "As we sit and talk about 
what to do with Arizona’s increased population, the 
people still keep coming . . . People worry about this 
becoming another Los Angeles [or older Eastern city?]
. . . the way we're going now, it won't be as good as 
L.A. " 5 2
Transportation planning in the Phoenix area has been 
oriented toward the existing highway system, and pre­
vailing evidence is that downtown traffic is relative­
ly stable and operating some forty percent under po­
tential capacity.^3 Planning for rail rapid transit 
has never been attempted due to ". . . the lack of a 
series of traffic origins going to a common destina­
tion in any transportation corridor,"54 and the low 
density of population resulting from urban sprawl.
The short-run impact of the energy crisis on journey- 
to-work trips in the Phoenix area was previously de­
termined to be a twenty-four percent diversion to 
carpools and alternative transportation modes. ^ 5 
Given this extremely high opportunity for a compensa­
tory response in times of fuel shortages, but partic­
ularly in the light of a continuing pattern of uncon­
trolled sprawl and an underutilized central city 
street system, rapid rail transit does not appear to 
be a justified expenditure in the forseeable future.
VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS ON TRANSPORTATION 
BALANCE
The study of three cities of varying development pat­
terns leads to certain inductive conclusions. It is 
apparent that urban centers are not uniform in terms 
of economic and land-use problems, with the logical 
conclusion that transportation-energy solutions to 
those problems cannot be uniformly applied. Further­
more, it is clear that criteria are necessary to de­
termine the appropriate mix of transportation invest­
ments for each type of metropolitan area, for purposes 
of both local planning and for federal policy.
Specific criteria do not easily fall out of these dis­
cussions. However, it may be concluded that older 
cities of low or falling worker concentration in the 
central city are not logical condidates for rail 
rapid transit but should be bus and highway oriented, 
whereas cities of substantial downtown employment may 
be more suitable choices for fixed route systems.
Thus, the fourth column of Table 2, containing a rank­
ing of the thirty cities selected for comparison, may 
be an appropriate guide, with cities in the first 
third being logical candidates, while those in the se­
cond third worthy of additional study. Furthermore, 
the planner would be advised to investigate local 
activity toward the termination of sprawl development, 
with the selection of specific radians or centers of 
denser industrial-commercial activity.
and possibly, the MARTA System, as Atlanta ranks 19th 
of 30. Certainly these cities have congestion pro­
blems, but the dispersion of their populace can only 
mean that fixed rail rapid transit will not serve a 
sufficiently high percentage of metropolitan area 
workers to justify the enormous expenditures. Table 8 
provides some evidence for this conclusion for the 
Baltimore region, in that only 496,000 miles of a 
total of nearly two million miles, or twenty-eight 
percent, are traveled by city dwellers to city employ­
ment. The remaining seventy-two percent of total 
mileage is traveled by city workers from outlying 
suburban counties, and thus many will not be attracted 
to a system whose nearest station is perhaps miles 
distant from their homes.
The indicated solutions in these cities are improve­
ments in bus systems and continued highway construction. 
While the bus solution is not disagreeable from either 
the energy^ or socio-economic^ perspectives, frequent 
adverse commentary has been voiced regarding the 
automobile. While it is true that this latter mode 
is energy inefficient by a substantial f a c to r , ^8 it 
is likely that political and macroeconomic considera­
tions alone will prevent any substantial reduction in 
automobile use.-^
There is no reason that more efficient engines and 
lighter, more aerodynamic body design cannot signi­
ficantly increase gasoline mileage, allowing full 
mobility within the context of the suburban orienta­
tion of our metropolitan areas. As petroleum grows 
scarcer and dearer to use for the private vehicle, it 
is completely reasonable to assume that the automobile 
will eventually be powered by other fuels, most not­
ably, coal and atomic energy, through electric batter­
ies or other storage methods.^0 These developments 
may be appropriate to considerations of environment 
and sociology, as well as energy and economics.
The policy and energy constraints now developing on 
planning for metropolitan areas demand the applica­
tion of rational criteria to the selection of balanced 
transportation systems.^ This paper has reviewed the 
present status of such constraints and has suggested 
a methodology for the planning of such systems.
Energy crisis impacts vary depending on the specific 
situation within each region given the potential of 
carpooling and the availability of alternative travel 
modes. However, in the longer-run, the viability of 
the various transportation solutions to fuel shortages 
is closely related to developmental patterns and cen­
tral city worker concentration.
Given these criteria, some current rapid transit pro­
grams appear to be counter to good planning logic: 
the BART System, as San Francisco ranks 27th of 30 in 
central city worker concentration; the District of 
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FIGURE 1
Historical variation in energy- 
intensivenesg of passenger modes.
TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION IN SELECTED 















































1,345,485 47.8 1 0
171,832 33.4 22
278,983 34.6 2 1
365,556 56.0 6
211,494 42.9 1 2
537,724 35.2 20
507,193 64. 5 3
295,014 67.3 2
274,860 53.3 7


















No. of Ranking of
Workers Worker
in Cen- Concentra-
tral City tion %s
(from
Col. 3)
Note: Certain SMSAs are identified in the Census
by a "two city" name, with the smaller city exclud­
ed in the above listing. These are: Los Angeles- 
Long Beach, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and San Fran-
Source: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Popu­
lation : 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Popula­
tion ; Table 82, Mobility, Commuting, and Veteran 
Status, for Areas and Places: 1970 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973).
188
TABLE 3 TABLE 4
MASS TRANSIT COMMUTATION 












Atlanta 51,805 156 8.9 14 (tie)
Baltimore 105,642 1,235 13.0 1 1
Boston 129,516 87,596 19.3 5
Buffalo 50,029 212 1 0 . 1 13
Chicago 389,821 254,289 22.9 2
Cincinnati 40,518 132 7.9 18
Cleveland 100,374 5,736 13.2 10
Dallas 39,847 334 6 . 2 21
Denver 20,228 447 4.2 27 (tie)
Detroit 120,520 1,269 8 . 0 17
Houston 40,279 347 5.2 25 (tie)
Indianapolis 23,847 122 5.5 23 (tie)
Kansas City 26,545 143 5.2 25 (tie)
Los Angeles 149,488 2,691 5.5 23 (tie)
Miami 44,080 399 8.8 16
Milwaukee 66,240 351 1 1 . 8 12
Minneapolis 65,647 128 8.9 14 (tie)
Newark 1 0 0 , 66 6 34,483 18.2 6
New Orleans 71,846 80 19.8 4
New York 513,292 1,,596,681 46.9 1
Philadelphia 245,684 135,129 20.4 3
Phoenix 4,256 129 1 . 2 30
Pittsburgh 121,076 1,018 14.3 9
Portland 22,354 155 5.7 22
St. Louis 65,833 245 7.5 19
San Diego 13.069 9,694 4.2 27 (tie)
San Francisco 183,595 8,268 15.2 8
San Jose 4,640 4,414 2.3 29
Seattle 37,316 133 6.9 20








Source: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Population:
1970, Subject Reports: Journey to Work, PC(2)-6D, Final 
Report; Table 2, Characteristics of Workers by Residence 
and Place of Work...(Washington: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1973).
HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT CAPITAL 
IMPROVEMENT PLANS, FOR SELECTED 












Atlanta 1 , 1 1 0 798 92
Baltimore 2,080 1,838 93
Boston 2,058 1,157 66
Buf falo 687 173 81
Chicago 5,097 1,482 68
Cincinnati 491 231 0
Cleveland 1,216 709 82
Dallas 3,071 462 75
Denver 696 446 0
Detroit 3,764 848 0
Houston 2,548 494 70
Indianapolis 313 63 0
Kansas City 947 183 80
Los Angeles 7,063 1,319 50
Miami 940 197 90
Milwaukee 679 119 0
Minneapolis 1,419 898 95
Newark NOT AVAILABLE
New Orleans 1,189 117 69
New York 7,941 7,031 90
Philadelphia 2,783 1,914 93
Phoenix 796 33 0
Pittsburgh 1 , 1 0 0 841 86
Portland 812 155 0
St. Louis 1,248 638 92
San Diego 922 242 0
San Francisco 2,850 1,641 77
San Jose NOT AVAILABLE
Seattle 1 , 1 2 1 340 0
Washington 2,707 2,147 96
Notes:
1
These estimates were developed by the various States 
in response to a U.S. Department of Transportation 
request for spending intentions under specified limits 
of federal aid ("Alternative III"). Therefore, par­
ticularly with reference to rail transit, they are not 
necessarily representative of actual plans.
2Not including local roads nor the costs of completing 
the Interestate System.
Source:
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1972 National Trans­
portation Report, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), p. 252.
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Note:
The "Private Automobile, Drivers" and "Private Automobile, Passengers" 
categories of the 1970 Census were combined as above in the 1960 
Census.
Source:
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1960, Subject 
Reports: Journey to Work, PC (2)-6B; Table 2, Metropolitan Status
and Location Relationships of Place of Residence and Place of 
Work of Workers During the Census Week (Washington: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1963).
Notes and Sources: See Table 5.
EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION IN BALTIMORE 







in Central City 147,455 92,211 79
in Surrounding 
SMSA Counties 87,522 13,874 127
Outside 
SMSA Counties 4,837 354 386
Total, Central 
City Workers 396,501
Total, SMSA workers 611,918
Percent, Central 




EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATIONS IN KANSAS 







in Central City 100,756 33,463 37
in Surrounding 
SMSA Counties 73,997 6,925 1 2
outside 
SMSA Counties 9,131 336 185
Total, Central 
City Workers 224,842
Total, SMSA workers 383,513
Percent, Central 
City Workers to 
SMSA Workers 58.6%
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EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATIONS IN 







in Central City 106,388 6,445 7
in Surrounding 
SMSA Counties 17,602 328 0
outside 
SMSA Counties 1,285 73 28
Total, Central
City Workers ' 132,156
Total, SMSA Workers 218,668
Percent, Central
Notes and Sources: See Table 5. City Workers to
SMSA Workers 60.4%
TABLE 8
JOURNEY-TO-WORK TRIPS AND MILEAGE 




































































































•^CThe County Seat was selected as an approxima­
tion of commuter residences for each county. 
Baltimore City mileage to the central city 
was obtained based on the location of resi­
dential neighborhoods within the city. Mile­
age from outside the SMSA was based on es­
timates from major towns lying beyond the 
SMSA counties.
Sources:
Maryland Department of Transportation,
State Highway System and Connections (State 
Map), 1972.
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Pop­
ulation : 1970, Subject Reports: Journey to 
Work, PC(2)-6D, Final Report; Table 2, 
Characteristics of Workers by Residence 
and Place of Work... (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973).
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